Distinguishing science from pseudoscience is not merely a theoretical problem in epistemology, that is, the branch of philosophy that studies the nature, sources, limits, and validity of scientific knowledge. It is a practical problem in our everyday lives which, if left unresolved, not only poses a threat but sometimes destroys the physical and mental health of certain unsuspecting people. We have become aware of this in recent times through media coverage of various aspects of the case involving the death of a well-known singer during a medical procedure at a clinic that was not certified to perform it.
More generally, pseudoscience has tangible consequences for physical health, consequences that are not immediately perceptible in mental health and social behavior, but also affect the soundness of spiritual life and the simplicity and purity of ecclesiastical life. The ecclesiastical mindset is corrupted when the truth of the faith becomes confused with fantasies that merely appear scientific and are presented with the authority of revelation and the supernatural. For this reason, it is necessary, even in the realm of spiritual life, to have a clear understanding of the limits of human science, as well as certain criteria for distinguishing it from pseudoscience.
It is hardly necessary to point out that the Internet is the principal channel through which pseudoscience spreads. Its online discourse is plethoric, though in many cases it is more inflationary than plethoric. Plethoric discourse can have a positive meaning: it can refer to discourse rich in expressive means, clear in its structure of proof, and founded on true premises or verifiable experimental data. Inflationary discourse, by contrast, resembles inflationary currency. It has negligible meaning, is empty of content, and is characterized by needless verbosity and exaggeration. In its most dangerous forms, it corrupts the meanings of words and distorts ideas.
Regarding these destructive effects of inflationary discourse, particularly in matters concerning medicine, as well as the question of how to distinguish science from pseudoscience, the remarks made by Jonathan Jarry are significant. Jarry is a biochemist with postgraduate studies in molecular biology and a specialist in science communication at McGill University, a public university in Montreal. He made these remarks in an interview with Sofia Christou published in the newspaper Kathimerini on September 24, 2026.
He points out at the outset that researchers working in medicine emphasize that pseudoscience is not always easy to recognize. This is chiefly because it can employ scientific terminology and refer to studies whose methods and findings a nonspecialist cannot evaluate or understand, while its “ambassadors” may participate in conferences and misuse medical language.
On the occasion of the case of a Canadian politician who used the title of doctor after graduating from a university in Honolulu, Jarry “had written a detailed article about the institution in question, the degrees it awards, and its connection with ideas that seek to transfer concepts from quantum physics into the field of health. As he noted, ‘The problem is not quantum physics itself, but the arbitrary transfer of genuine scientific concepts to unsubstantiated practices in order to give them scientific authority.’”
It is very difficult for a nonspecialist to understand that a particular practice is unsubstantiated when it has been given a false appearance of scientific method. How can someone suspect that deception, a lie, lies behind such a plausible appearance? Jonathan Jarry identifies several warning signs that should make us cautious. He explains that the most important include a strong dependence of a purported “treatment” on dietary supplements; an emphasis on personal testimonials in the advertising of a treatment; and, above all, the use of vague claims, such as the assertion that a treatment helps the body heal itself. He adds that we should also be wary of the idea that something is good simply because it is “natural.”
Another characteristic of pseudoscience is the oversimplification of biology. “For example, the claim that there is one cause for all diseases and one treatment for everything is wrong, because real medicine is complicated. If something begins to sound too good to be true, it is probably misleading.”
Regarding the confusion that prevails among many people, Jarry observes that conferences promoting pseudoscientific subjects are now being held, sometimes making pseudoscience appear more legitimate and trustworthy than science itself. “That is why one needs sufficient knowledge to evaluate the validity of a health claim encountered on the Internet.”
His remarks about personal testimonials also deserve particular attention. Personal experience, by itself, cannot demonstrate that a particular treatment brought about an improvement in health. “Clinical studies are needed for the way a treatment works to be scientifically substantiated.” Personal testimonials, however, are influenced by human psychology. Scientific data do not have the appeal of “a good personal story, and for this reason people are deceived.” A story with a happy ending is appealing and can therefore easily become misleading.
At the same time, pseudoscience often allies itself with conspiracy theories and peculiar forms of religiosity. Nowadays, these usually originate in extreme Protestant groups in America. Such groups do not rely solely on Holy Scripture; some also put down roots in, and draw nourishment from, non-Christian, spiritualist, and other similar “reservoirs of thought.”
The points we have noted from Jonathan Jarry’s interview do not mean that every criticism of science amounts to conspiracy theorizing, nor that science in general is infallible. Science is an organized way of producing reliable knowledge about the natural world. Knowledge is reliable when it can be tested. Scientific research is published in scientific journals. Before publication, it is examined by a committee of experts; once published, it is exposed to scrutiny, verification, refutation, or corrective criticism by the worldwide community of scientific experts. Scientific knowledge is not secret knowledge possessed by a select few.
Evaluation by fellow researchers does not, of course, guarantee that a study is infallible; rather, it functions as a filter for errors. At the same time, science expresses varying degrees of uncertainty: it speaks in terms of probabilities, limits, margins of error, and levels of evidential support. Changing a scientific position when new evidence emerges is not a weakness. It is progress, a movement toward more complete knowledge.
Pseudoscience imitates the authority of science without accepting its limitations. It usually begins with a desired conclusion and then selects only the data that support it. It invokes individual success stories while ignoring failures. It often confuses temporal sequence with causation: because one event followed another, it is assumed that the first caused the second. Another characteristic is “immunity to refutation.” Every piece of contrary evidence is interpreted as proof that the theory is more profound than it appears, that its critics are not ready or capable of understanding it, or that powerful people whose interests are threatened are concealing the truth.
It is a fact that genuine science can contain errors and give rise to conflicts of interest. The difference lies chiefly in the overall practice. The scientific community has procedures for criticism, publication, replication, and revision, whereas pseudoscience tends to protect its central claim from any meaningful scrutiny. For this reason, it is always useful to ask: What is the success rate of a particular treatment method, for example? Have negative results been published? Do independent research teams agree about its effectiveness? What would lead its supporters to change their favorable opinion? The vaguer the answers to these questions, the stronger the suspicion that we are dealing with pseudoscience.
All these things concern the world of the present age. This is how fallen man operates: dominated by corruption and mortality, and confined to the sensible universe. His science and its methods must not be confused with faith, which is “the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen” (Hebrews 11:1). It is well known, after all, from the elementary teachings of Orthodox Christian epistemology, that the method of knowing created things differs from the method of knowing God.
For the person who lives in subjection to the elements of the world, science, with its criteria, places limits on the unrestrained fantasies of grandiose individuals who, it seems, do not hesitate to put at risk the lives of those who trust them.
